The filing of a claim under CEPA acts as a waiver of other retaliation claims. The relevant statutory text reads:
Nothing in this act shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any employee under any other federal or State law or regulation or under any collective bargaining agreement or employment contract; except that the institution of an action in accordance with this act shall be deemed a waiver of the rights and remedies available under any other contract, collective bargaining agreement, State law, rule or regulation or under the common law. N.J.S.A. 34:19-8.
"The causes of action that fall within this waiver provision are those causes of action that are directly related to the employee's termination due to disclosure of the employer's wrongdoing.” Falco v. Community Medical Center, 296 N.J.Super. 298, 318, 686 A.2d 1212 (App.Div.1997) overruled on other grounds by Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 463, 828 A.2d 893 (2003) (quoting Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J.Super. 221, 238, 645 A.2d 1238 (App.Div.1994)), aff'd 141N.J. 16, 660A. 2d1153 ( 1995) (dismissing claims for retaliatory discharge, constitutional tort, negligent infliction of emotional stress, intentional infliction of emotional stress, and discharge in violation of public policy as waived by plaintiff's assertion of a CEPA claim).
Causes of action that are “substantially independent” from the CEPA claims are not waived by institution of a CEPA action. See Young,141N.J. at29, 33, 660A. 2d1153. The question is whether the other claims require different proofs from those required to sustain a CEPA claim. See id.at30-31, 660A. 2d1153. If a claim once proven would not be a violation of CEPA, such claim would not be waived by assertion of a CEPA claim. See Casper v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., 787 F.Supp. 1480, 1509 (D.N.J.1992).
